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BEYOND BATSON v. KENTUCKY: A PROPOSED ETHICAL
RULE PROHIBITING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
JURY SELECTION
ANDREW G. GORDON
INTRODUCTION
Recently, a jury found Henry Watson and Damian Williams not guilty
of attempted murder.1 The two black men had attacked a white truck
driver named Reginald Denny at an intersection in Los Angeles during
the infamous riots which consumed that city in April, 1992.2 Those riots
had followed the acquittals of four white police officers who, themselves,
were charged with the brutal beating of a black motorist named Rodney
King.3 With the verdicts in the Watson and Williams trial, many resi-
dents of Los Angeles felt a sense of relief.4 Regardless of what people
actually thought of the outcome, many believed the verdicts to be the
"closing chapter" to the entire affair.' For the justice system, however,
the book remains open.
Through the use of the peremptory challenge,' defense counsel for the
1. See Edward Boyer & John L. Mitchell, Attempted Murder Acquittal, Deadlock
Wind-Up Denny Tial, L.A. Times, Oct. 21, 1993, at Al; William Hamilton, Jury De-
clines to Convict LA. Defendants on Last Two Charges, Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1993, at A3;
Seth Mydans, Acquittal and Deadlock End the Trial of Two in Riot Beating, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 21, 1993, at Al; John Riley, It's Over at Denny Trial, N.Y. Newsday, Oct. 21, 1993,
at 3.
2. See supra note 1.
3. See Seth Mydans, A Jury's Trial" Will Memories of Riots Influence a Verdict,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1993, § 4, at 7. The riots caused over fifty deaths and at least a
billion dollars in damage. See id
4. See Relief in Los Angeles, Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 25, 1993, at 18; George de
Lama, Worn-Out LA. Hopes It Has Seen the Last of Blockbuster Trials, Chi. Trib., Oct.
24, 1993, at IC.
5. See Needed- An End to a Sad Chapter, L.A. Times, Oct. 26, 1993, at B6; Mydans,
supra note 1, at Al (quoting Mayor Richard Riordan of Los Angeles as stating that with
the verdicts Los Angeles can "look to the future"); Robert Reinhold, Calm Streets in Los
Angeles Ratify Verdict of the Public, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1993, at A4 (noting most police
officers felt that it was "time to move forward").
6. Jury selection begins when the court calls upon a group of people to serve as the
"venire." See generally Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain
Commitment to Representative Panels 85-137 (1977) (discussing the process of assem-
bling the group of prospective jurors). After being summoned, this group of potential
jurors is subjected to a process known as "voir dire," which literally means" 'to speak the
truth' or 'to see what is said.'" Id at 140. Voir dire is an often lengthy period of pre-trial
questioning to determine an individual's ability to try a case impartially. See id. at 139;
see also Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 Stan. L
Rev. 545, 545 (1975). During voir dire, attorneys challenge jurors in one of two ways in
order "to eliminate those who are sympathetic to the other side": (I) by challenging
them for cause, or (2) by exercising the peremptory challenge. Babcock, supra, at 551.
Attorneys can exercise the challenge for cause as many times as needed. See Van
Dyke, supra, at 140 (stating that "[c]hallenges for cause have the virtue of being unlim-
ited"). The challenge for cause, however, may be utilized only for particular displays of
bias as specifically articulated by statute. See Babcock, supra, at 549 n.16; Van Dyke,
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four police officers accused of beating King were able to eliminate each
potential black juror on the venire.7 This discriminatory use of the per-
emptory challenge, however, was not a new trial practice.8 Indeed, some
six years earlier, Justice Marshall lamented that the practice of peremp-
torily removing minority jurors from the venire was "both common and
flagrant."9
In 1986, the Supreme Court attempted to tame the misuse of the per-
emptory challenge. Batson v. Kentucky'o developed a framework for the
lower courts to analyze cases of alleged discrimination in jury selection. " I
In short, it first required the objecting party to demonstrate a prima facie
case of discrimination.' 2 Batson then required the opposing party to re-
but the inference of discrimination. 3
Lower court implementation of the Batson decision, however, has been
anything but successful in preventing the continued use of the peremp-
tory challenge as a tool of racial discrimination.' 4 Attorneys have be-
come adept at rebutting prima facie cases of discrimination by creating
"acceptable" reasons for their strikes. Moreover, the courts have readily
accepted these pretextual explanations, thereby allowing attorneys to
evade the mandate of Batson.15
In order for Batson to become successful in eliminating racial discrimi-
nation in jury selection, the use of pretextual reasoning to rationalize per-
emptory challenges must be halted. While some have looked to the
courts for the solution, this Note proposes that the legal community itself
supra, at 143-44. Moreover, the challenge for cause must be approved by the judge. See
Babcock, supra, at 549; Van Dyke, supra, at 143-45; see, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 270.20 (McKinney 1993) (listing reasons why New York courts may grant a challenge
for cause in a criminal case).
In contrast, the number of peremptory challenges is limited. See Van Dyke, supra, at
145; see, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b) (limiting the number of peremptory challenges, in
non-capital felony cases, to six for the government and ten for the defendant); N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law § 270.25 (McKinney 1993) (listing number of strikes for different types of
crimes). More importantly, the party exercising a peremptory challenge need not offer
the court a reason for striking a particular juror. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
220 (1965) (stating that the "peremptory challenge is ... exercised without a reason
stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control"); see also Bab-
cock, supra, at 550; Van Dyke, supra, at 139-40.
7. See Barbara A. Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury
Service, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1139, 1140-41 n.6 (1992).
8. See Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Di-
rection (Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of
Equal Protection), 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1026, 1041-42 (1987) (stating that the evidence of
racial discrimination in jury selection would be "voluminous and sadly intuitive"); Van
Dyke, supra note 6, at 152-60 (cataloging the "[a]ll too frequent[ ] ... radical reduction
or total elimination of... particular segment[s] of the population").
9. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
10. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
11. See infra notes 22-50 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.B.
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should take the lead in remedying the pretextual problem.' 6 Thus, this
Note proposes that the American Bar Association formulate an ethical
rule, such as the one proposed herein, to prohibit discrimination during
jury selection.17
Part I of this Note reviews Batson v. Kentucky and the subsequent
Supreme Court cases expanding its holding. 8 Part II closely examines
the issue of pretextuality and its pervasive use by attorneys in their expla-
nations for challenges.1 9 Finally, Part III proposes an ethical rule
designed to curb lawyers from using peremptory challenges solely for the
purpose of racial discrimination.2" This Note concludes by urging the
adoption of such a rule as the best approach to eliminating the peremp-
tory challenge as a tool of racial discrimination.2
I. BATSON AND ITS PROGENY
A. Batson v. Kentucky
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court considered the constitution-
ality of a prosecutor's use of four peremptory challenges to eliminate
every potential black juror on the venire in the trial of a black man
charged with burglary.22 The all-white jury found the accused guilty."
Continuing its "unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination in the
procedures used to select the venire,"24 the Court reversed the convic-
tion, holding that the practice of using peremptory challenges to dismiss
jurors solely on the basis of their race violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause.25
Batson required the Supreme Court to re-examine the holding of Swain
v. Alabama,26 the Court's last major pronouncement on the peremptory
challenge.27 In Swain, the defendant claimed he was denied his Equal
Protection rights due to the prosecutor's exercise of several peremptory
16. See infra notes 284-326 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 22-90 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 91-259 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 260-326 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 327-31 and accompanying text.
22. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82-83 (1986).
23. See id at 83.
24. Id. at 85. For a detailed discussion of the Court's decisions with regard to jury
selection prior to Batson, see David D. Hopper, Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the
Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 Va.
L. Rev. 811, 812-15 (1988); Mintz, supra note 8, at 1029-31; Paul H. Schwartz, Com-
ment, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in
North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1533, 1539-42 (1991).
25. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85. The Batson holding applies equally to the federal govern-
ment through the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See United States v.
Lewis, 837 F.2d 415, 416 n.2 (9th Cir.) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923 (1988).
26. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
27. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 82.
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challenges against black members of the venire.28 In rejecting the de-
fendant's claim, the Swain Court held that only proof of the systematic
exclusion of potential black jurors through the peremptory challenge
could evidence an equal protection violation.29 Noting the practical diffi-
culties defendants faced in proving a systematic exclusion over a period
of time,3 ° the Batson Court rejected this evidentiary burden."a Rather,
the Batson Court allowed movants to demonstrate racially discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges through evidence obtained solely from ob-
serving the prosecutor at the movant's own trial.3 2
The Batson Court outlined a framework for analyzing cases of pur-
poseful discrimination. Under Batson, defendants must first show a
"prima facie case in the context of discriminatory selection of the ve-
nire."33 Once the defendant provides facts supporting an inference of
discrimination, the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to articulate
race-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenge.3 4 Ultimately, the trial
court must determine whether the defendant successfully has demon-
strated that the challenge is of a discriminatory nature.3 5
To evidence a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the de-
fendant must demonstrate that "the totality of the relevant facts gives
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose."3 6 In establishing such a
case, the defendant first must show that "he is a member of a cognizable
racial group" and that the prosecutor used her peremptory challenges to
eliminate members of that racial group from the venire.37 The movant
then must prove to the trial court that the "facts and any other relevant
circumstances" surrounding the use of the challenges support an infer-
28. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 202.
29. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (1991) (describing Swain holding).
30. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 92 & n.17.
31. See id. at 93.
32. See id. at 95-96.
33. Id. at 96.
34. See id. at 97.
35. See id. at 98.
36. Id. at 94.
37. Id. at 96. The Batson Court did not address the question of what constitutes a
"cognizable racial group." Batson involved the peremptory challenge of black jurors. In
another case concerning a discriminatory challenge, the Supreme Court extended Bat-
son's holding to Latinos. See Hernandez v. New York, Ill S. Ct. 1859, 1872-73 (1991).
Currently, the Supreme Court is considering whether women should be considered a cog-
nizable group for the purposes of Batson. See J.E.B. v. T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993).
Lower federal and state courts apply Batson to a myriad of groups, including Asians,
see, e.g., Kline v. State, 737 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), Italian-Americans,
see, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp 96, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 89
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1982), Native Americans, see, e.g., United
States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 1987), whites, see, e.g., Roman v.
Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 225-28 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989), and,
even French-Canadians with Gallic surnames, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 449
N.E.2d 686, 691-92 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Commonwealth v. Bourgeois,
465 N.E.2d 1180 (Mass. 1984).
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ence of discrimination."a The Supreme Court advised the lower courts
that evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination could be provided
either through the questions and comments made by an attorney during
voir dire" or the existence of "a 'pattern' of strikes against black ju-
rors.' ' The Batson Court cautioned, however, that these examples were
"merely illustrative" and trial court judges must decide for themselves
what circumstances are relevant in any particular case.4 '
Following the demonstration of a prima facie case,42 the burden shifts
to the prosecutor to rebut the inference of discrimination.4  Rebuttal
entails offering a racially neutral explanation for challenging the poten-
tial juror." The Supreme Court emphasized that this explanation need
not rise to the level of a challenge for cause.45 The Court cautioned,
however, that attorneys could not expect lower courts to rely on the at-
torney's good faith or intuitive judgment.46 Valid explanations, the Bat-
38. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
39. See icL at 97. An example of this type of case occurred in Splunge v. Clark, 960
F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1992). In Splunge, the prosecutor, during voir dire, had the following
exchange with a potential juror:
[Prosecutor]: Okay. Now, Mr. Clark, as is very obvious, you are a Negro
man, and [the defendant] is a Negro man. The fact that you are both of the
same race, what effect, if any, will that have on your ability to be fair and im-
partial as a juror?
[Juror]: None.
[Prosecutor]: You can put that aside? You're not going to give [the defend-
ant]'s testimony, if he testifies, more credit just because he's a black man?
.[Y]ou're not going to look on him more favorably just because of race?
[Juror]: No.
Id. at 707-08. The court found this line of questioning sufficient evidence for the defend-
ant to establish a prima facie case.
40. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Since attorneys rarely provide judges with clear proof of
their motives behind their voir dire questions or comments, courts tend to focus on
whether a pattern of strikes exists. The Batson Court, however, left unanswered the ques-
tion of how many strikes are needed to demonstrate a "pattern." A related problem, also
left unresolved, is what to do in the case where a prosecutor permits a small number of
token minority jurors on the venire but excludes a larger number from it. For a good
discussion of these problems, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Juty"
Voir Dire Peremptory Challenges; and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
153, 170-73, 179-80 (1989); Hopper, supra note 24, at 821-25; Mintz, supra note 8, at
1033 n.60.
41. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
42. Commentators suggest that the evidentiary requirements placed on the movant in
making a prima facie case should not be an onerous burden. See John H. Blume, Racial
Discrimination in the State's Use of Peremptory Challenges The Application of the United
States Supreme Court's Decision in Batson v. Kentucky in South Carolina, 40 S.C. L. Rev.
299, 330 (1989); Hopper, supra note 24, at 825. According to these commentators, to
place a heavy burden on the movant would controvert the purpose of Batson. Batson's
goal was to replace the former evidentiary standard formulated by the Court in Swain v.
Alabama, which was considered "a crippling burden of proof." Batson, 476 U.S. at 92 &
n.17. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (discussing Swain holding).
43. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
44. See id.
45. See id
46. See id at 97-98; see, e.g., Splunge v. Clark, 960 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1992)
1993]
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son Court stated, must be "clear and reasonably specific,"' 47 expounding
upon "legitimate reasons ... related to the particular case to be tried."
41
After giving the prosecutor an opportunity to rebut the movant's prima
facie case, the trial court must determine if the peremptory challenge
was, in fact, race-based.49 The Batson Court concluded that because this
evaluation is so fact-specific, turning on issues such as credibility and
appearance, an appellate court should give great deference to the findings
of the trial court.5"
B. Post-Batson Cases: Expanding the Holding
In his Batson concurrence, Justice White forewarned that "[m]uch liti-
gation will be required to spell out the contours of the Court's... hold-
ing."51 In addition, another commentator has remarked that "clarifying
the scope of Batson has become almost an annual event for the Court."5 2
Indeed, since handing down its decision, the Supreme Court has ex-
tended the holding of Batson to "effectuate its overarching rationale."5 "
(explanation inadequate where attorney argued: "'[S]he would not be a good juror in
this case, and I can assure you that they were not racial motivations at al' "); United
States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1544 (11th Cir. 1989) (illegitimate challenge where
attorney argued: "'I don't have any particular reason. I just got a feeling about him' ").
47. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n.20 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)).
48. Id.
49. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. The Batson Court made "no attempt to instruct" the
lower courts on how to reach such a decision. Id. at 99-100. Instead, the Court left it to
these lower courts to formulate the appropriate procedures in evaluating a Batson chal-
lenge (including both parties' roles in such a procedure). Various commentators have
suggested possible procedures. See generally Brett M. Kavanaugh, Note, Defense Pres-
ence and Participation: A Procedural Minimum for Batson v. Kentucky Hearings, 99
Yale L.J. 187 (1989) (suggesting that courts should allow both parties to present evidence
and participate fully in a Batson determination hearing); L. Ashley Lyu, Note, Getting at
the Truth: Adversarial Hearings in Batson Inquiries, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 725 (1989)
(arguing that an adversarial hearing is mandated by the Constitution).
Moreover, the Batson Court also left unresolved the issue of a proper remedy for an
inadequate explanation. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99-100 n.24 (alluding to two possible
remedies: either seating the challenged juror or dismissing the entire venire and reselect-
ing another jury). But see Alschuler, supra note 40, at 177-78 (arguing that neither rem-
edy discussed by the Batson Court is adequate).
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, took issue with the Court for leaving so
many open questions in such an important opinion. Indeed, the Chief Justice "wish[ed]
the [lower court] judges well [in] . .. find[ing] their way through the morass the Court
creates today." Batson, 476 U.S. at 131 (Burger, C.J, dissenting).
50. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21; see also United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243,
1246 (11th Cir. 1991) (advocating that the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate a
proffered explanation because "selection ... is by nature a subjective process which relies
heavily on the instincts of the attorneys, the atmosphere in the courtroom, and the reac-
tions of the potential jurors to questioning"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1279 (1992).
51. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (White, J., concurring).
52. Stephanie Goldberg, Batson & The Straight-Face Test, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at
82.
53. The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, Leading Cases, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 262
(1991).
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Powers v. Ohio54 eliminated Batson's requirement that the defendant
and the excluded juror be members of the same race to demonstrate a
successful prima facie case of discrimination.55 In Powers, the prosecutor
struck seven black persons on the venire in the murder trial of a white
man.56 The white defendant sought to invoke the protections of Batson
and have the prosecutor explain the challenges." Because Batson re-
quired racial identity between the defendant and the excluded juror, 8 the
trial court rejected the defendant's request.59
Powers first reaffirmed its commitment to the principles enunciated in
Batson. "[T]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from us-
ing the State's peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and
unbiased persons from the ... jury solely by reason of their race, a prac-
tice that forecloses a significant opportunity to participate in civic life. ' 6°
Before applying Batson to the case before it, however, the Powers Court
needed to address whether a criminal defendant had standing to raise the
constitutional rights of the excluded juror.6' In answering this question
in the affirmative, the Court noted that a defendant would be an effective
proponent of the excluded juror's rights.62 Furthermore, considerable
barriers existed that made it impractical for the excluded juror to raise
his or her own rights.63 Thus, the Court concluded that race was irrele-
vant to the standing inquiry.64
The Supreme Court next addressed the question of whether Batson
should apply to private litigants in a civil case. In Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.,65 a black construction worker brought a negligence action
54. 111 S. CL 1364 (1991).
55. See id at 1366.
56. See id One commentator speculated that the prosecutor struck the black venire-
persons in this case in part due to the common stereotype that suggests blacks are lenient
towards defendants. See The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, Leading Cases, supra note 53,
at 257 n.13; see also Jere W. Morehead, Prohibiting Race-Based Peremptory Challenge"
Should the Principle of Equal Protection Be Extended To Private Litigants?, 65 Tul. L.
Rev. 833, 837 & n.35 & n.36 (1991) ("[S]tudies found that prosecutors... believe that
minorities were more likely to favor defendants in criminal cases.").
57. See Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1366.
58. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
59. See Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1366. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Powers' appeal. Id.
60. Id at 1370.
61. See id.; see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-16 (1976) (discussing third-
party standing).
62. See Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1372 (stating that a criminal defendant "has much at
stake in proving that his jury was improperly constituted due to an equal protection
violation, for [the Supreme Court has] recognized that discrimination in the jury selection
process may lead to the reversal of a conviction").
63. See id at 1372-73. Among these obstacles are the difficulties in obtaining evi-
dence, a small financial incentive to litigate and the costs of litigation. Indeed, the Court
concluded that "[tihe reality is that a juror dismissed because of race probably will leave
the courtroom possessing little incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to
vindicate his own rights." Id at 1373.
64. See id
65. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
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following injury in a job-site accident.66 During voir dire, counsel for
defense exercised two of three allotted strikes to eliminate blacks from
the jury. 67 Noting that "discrimination on the basis of race in selecting a
jury in a civil proceeding harms the excluded juror no less than discrimi-
nation in a criminal trial,",6 1 the Edmonson Court extended Batson's ban
on race-based challenges to civil cases.69
In order to arrive at this conclusion, the Edmonson Court first needed
to establish that the exercise of peremptory challenges by a private liti-
gant constituted state action, subjecting their use to the requirements of
the Fifth Amendment.7" The Court found that the peremptory challenge
existed only through the express authorization of the government (in the
form of statutes outlining procedures for its use)71 and performed a tradi-
tional governmental function (the selection of an impartial jury).7 2
Moreover, the injury suffered by the excluded jurors was intensified by
the fact that it occurred within the courthouse, a symbol of individual
rights and justice.73 Thus, the Edmonson Court held that the use of the
peremptory challenge constituted state action. 74 Therefore, race-based
7-5
strikes violated the equal protection rights of the challenged juror.
Having arrived at this conclusion, the Court then proceeded to find that
a movant had standing to raise the excluded juror's rights.7 6 Finally,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, made clear that "[i]f our soci-
ety is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recog-
nize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that
progress and causes continued hurt and injury.")7 7
The Court's last major pronouncement on Batson broadened that deci-
sion's holding to include peremptory challenges exercised by a defendant
66. See id. at 2080-81.
67. See id. at 2081; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988) (allotting three peremptory chal-
lenges to each side in a civil case in federal court).
68. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082; see also Morehead, supra note 56, at 847 (stating
that the "members of the community who are called for jury duty should not be provided
with any less protection against racial discrimination because of their assignment to a
civil case rather than a criminal case").
69. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2088-89.
70. See id. at 2082-83. The Court followed the "framework for state action analysis
set forth in" Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Edmonson, 111 S.
Ct. at 2082. Lugar first requires a court to consider whether the claimed constitutional
violation results from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state author-
ity. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939-41. Then the court must determine whether the private party
acted as a state actor. Id. at 941-42.
71. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
72. See id. at 2085-87. The Court also noted the extent of judicial supervision over
voir dire. See id. at 2084-85.
73. See id. at 2087 ("To permit racial exclusion in this official forum compounds the
racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by the color of his or her skin.").
74. See id. at 2080.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 2087-88. The Edmonson Court followed the third party standing analy-
sis of Powers v. Ohio. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
77. Id. at 2088.
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in a criminal case. In Georgia v. McCollum,7 three whites were indicted
following a racially motivated attack on a black couple.79 Prior to jury
selection, the prosecutor, fearing that the defense would use their strikes
to eliminate blacks from the jury, sought to have Batson apply to the
criminal proceeding."' The trial court denied the request8" and the
Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed that decision."
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Batson applied with equal
force to criminal defendants.83 As in Edmonson, a the McCollum Court
first found that the criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges constituted state action, thereby subjecting their use to the stric-
tures of the Fourteenth Amendment." Indeed, the Supreme Court
expressly rejected the notion that a criminal defendant's adversarial rela-
tionship with the government precluded a finding of state action. 6
Moreover, as in Powers 7 and Edmonson, 8 the Court held that a state
prosecutor had standing to raise the constitutional rights of the excluded
juror.8 9 Thus, the McCollum Court "reaffirm[ed] ... that the exercise of
a peremptory challenge must not be based on either the race of the juror
or the racial stereotypes held by the party."9
II. THE PRETEXTUALITY PROBLEM
The success of Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny depends largely on
what explanations lower courts accept from attorneys attempting to re-
but a prima facie case of discrimination. Justice Marshall feared that the
use of pretextual reasoning at this stage of the inquiry would render "the
protection erected by the Court [in Batson]. .. illusory."'" In his con-
currence to Batson, he predicted that attorneys could easily assert facially
race-neutral reasons for their strikes, regardless of their true intent, and
the trial courts would be "ill equipped to second-guess those reasons." '
Thus far, Justice Marshall's concerns over the use of pretextual reasoning
appear well founded. Lower courts have been unable to distinguish legit-
78. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
79. See id at 2351.
80. See id at 2351-52.
81. See id at 2352. The trial court stated that "[n]either Georgia nor federal law
prohibits criminal defendants from exercising peremptory strikes in a racially discrimina-
tory manner." Id
82. See State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ga. 1991).
83. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992).
84. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
85. See McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354-57.
86. See id at 2356 ("Lastly, the fact that a defendant exercises a peremptory chal-
lenge to further his interest in acquittal does not conflict with a finding of state action.").
87. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing third party standing).
88. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing third party standing).
89. See McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357.
90. Iad at 2359.
91. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
92. Iad
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imate reasons for a peremptory strike from those that serve as "mere...
excuses for discrimination." 93
A. The Supreme Court and Pretextuality
Significantly, the Supreme Court has provided almost no guidance to
the lower courts in assessing attorneys' proffered reasons for peremptory
challenges. Batson itself instructed judges only that explanations needed
to be "clear and reasonably specific" as well as related to the particular
case before the court.94 Without adequate guidelines as to what this
means, lower courts in reviewing peremptory strikes are accepting both
those rationales that serve as pretext and those that are truly legitimate."
And, as a direct result, Batson's goal of eliminating racial discrimination
from the jury selection process remains unfulfilled.96
Lynn v. Alabama,97 a case in which the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari, is illustrative of this unwillingness to come to terms with the crucial
issue of pretextual reasoning. In Lynn, the prosecutor used his chal-
lenges to eliminate all of the potential black jurors on the venire in the
murder trial of a black man.98 During the Batson hearing, the prosecutor
successfully rebutted the prima facie case of discrimination by giving a
juror-by-juror explanation of his strikes. 99
Justice Marshall, dissenting to the denial of certiorari, took issue with
two of the peremptory strikes. Two of the potential jurors were struck
because they "live[d] on the Gammage Road in an area where the de-
fendant, Frederick Lynn, was living at the time of this crime."'" Hence,
the prosecutor explained, he felt that there existed the possibility of the
defendant and the two jurors knowing one another, thus affecting the
93. Hon. Theodore McMillan & Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A
Promise Unfulfilled, 58 UMKC L. Rev. 361, 369 (1990).
94. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n.20.
95. See Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York." Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of
Spanish, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 16 (1992) (stating that "many trial courts automatically
accept the prosecutor's 'race-neutral' explanations without critical evaluation"); Brian J.
Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Ju-
risprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 43 (1988) (stating that
"trial judges accept virtually any explanation").
96. See Hopper, supra note 24, at 831 ("Only if lower courts perform a critical analy-
sis of the prosecutor's rebuttal in all cases will they give real meaning to the principles
underlying Batson."); McMillan & Petrini, supra note 93, at 369 ("Ineffective scrutiny of
prosecutor's explanations is the single greatest problem hindering the effective implemen-
tation of Batson."); see also Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious Legacy: Discrimina-
tory Juror exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 336,
361 (1993) (noting the inability of courts to eliminate pretextual responses which "violate
the purpose and spirit of Batson").
97. 493 U.S. 945 (1989).
98. Id. at 946 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. Id. See Ex parte Lynn, 543 So.2d 709, 711 (Ala. 1988) (listing the following as
reasons for dismissal: relationship to the defendant, possessing a criminal record, work-
ing with the defendant's father, residence, a history of drug use, age, and friendship with
the defendant's stepmother).
100. Lynn, 493 U.S. at 947 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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jurors' ability to hear the case.' °1 Justice Marshall proceeded to make
two observations about these strikes.
First, if the prosecutor truly believed that the jurors were possibly bi-
ased, he could have established this fact through questioning during voir
dire. Oddly enough, however, the prosecutor did not even ask "these
potential jurors whether they actually knew anyone involved in the trial,
although he had ample opportunity to do so." '°2 Indeed, Justice Mar-
shall noted that "[s]uch an inquiry is a standard part of voir dire prac-
tice.""0 3 Moreover, had the prosecutor confirmed his feelings that the
jurors were possibly biased because of their residences' proximity to the
defendant, the prosecutor then could have utilized the challenge for
cause and saved his peremptory challenges."° Thus, Marshall concluded
that this behavior suggested that the residence of the jurors served as
mere pretext for racial discrimination.105
Furthermore, Gammage Road was an area "populated primarily by
people of color."'0 6 Justice Marshall commented that in many commu-
nities, one's race and one's address are synonymous. 0 7 Thus, such char-
acteristics that can easily serve as surrogates for race "should not be
regarded as a legitimate basis for exercising peremptory challenges with-
out some corroboration on voir dire that the challenged venirepersons
actually entertain the bias underlying the use of that factor."108 Signifi-
cantly, the prosecutor had admitted, during the Batson hearing, his
knowledge of the racial make-up of the area along Gammage Road. '9
Again, the prosecutor's failure to establish the presence of actual bias
leads to a conclusion that residence served as an "overly broad proxy for
bias."11° Thus, Justice Marshall would have granted certiorari "to deter-
mine whether . . . reliance on a nonracial criterion in exercising ...
peremptory jury challenges violates [Batson] where that criterion is
highly correlated to race and the bias that the [attorney] seeks to exclude
through the use of that criterion could easily have been discovered on
voir dire."' I
Indeed, in not addressing a case such as Lynn, the Supreme Court fails
to provide adequate guidance to lower courts faced with similar uses of
pretextual reasoning. Thus, the confusion surrounding the rebuttal stage
of a Batson inquiry remains. Moreover, this creates a danger that other
lower courts will continue to allow potential surrogates for race, such as
101. See id.
102. Id
103. Id.
104. See id
105. See id
106. Id.
107. See id
108. Id
109. See id
110. Id.
111. Lynn, 493 U.S. at 945-46.
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residence, to serve as legitimate race neutral explanations, even when un-
corroborated. The net result is not only that jurors are denied their
Equal Protection rights under Batson, but also that courts foster racial
stereotyping in the jury selection process.1 12
Hernandez v. New York 113 provided the Supreme Court yet another
opportunity to discuss the issue of pretextuality. Once again the Court
punted. In Hernandez, a Latino defendant, on trial for attempted mur-
der, objected to the prosecutor's challenging of all four Latinos on the
venire.'1 4 After the defense raised the objections, the prosecutor ex-
plained that two of the strikes were exercised because the jurors had fam-
ily members with criminal records.' 5 The other two were struck
because of their Spanish-speaking ability." 6 Indeed, the prosecutor felt
that the jurors' knowledge of Spanish would hinder their willingness to
"accept the interpreter as the final arbiter of what was said by each of the
witnesses, especially where there were going to be Spanish-speaking wit-
nesses." 117 Despite assurances by the potential jurors that "they would
try to follow the interpreter," the jurors' demeanor led the prosecutor to
believe otherwise.' 18 Moreover, the prosecutor thought that these two
Spanish-speaking jurors "would have an undue impact upon the jury." " 9
It was the trial court's acceptance of the reasoning behind these last
strikes which the defendant appealed. 120 The defendant argued that the
reason given by the prosecutor, the jurors' bilingualism, was not race-
neutral but rather was a pretext to keep Latinos off the jury in the trial of
a Latino. Pointing to "the high correlation between Spanish-language
ability and ethnicity in New York, where the case was tried," the defend-
ant argued that one's proficiency in Spanish could easily serve as a surro-
gate for race.' 2 ' Indeed, census data reveals that, at the time of the trial,
112. See Ex parte Lynn, 543 So. 2d 709, 715 (1988) (Jones, J., concurring specially)
("How long, oh, how long will we persist in the hollow notion that black jurors are less
likely to convict criminally accused black defendants than are white jurors to convict
white defendants?").
113. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
114. See id. at 1864.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 1864-65.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1865. In a subsequent conversation with the trial court, the prosecutor
stated that he "just felt from the hesitancy in their answers and their lack of eye contact
that they would not be able to do it." Id. at 1865 n. 1.
119. Id. at 1865.
120. See id. at 1864. Both the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, see Peo-
ple v. Hernandez, 140 A.D.2d 543, 528 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), and the
New York Court of Appeals, see People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350 (1990), affirmed
the judgement.
121. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1866. Apparently, the prosecutor relies on a mistaken
assumption that Latino jurors, through their Spanish ability, will be able to distort the
testimony given in Spanish to the benefit of the Latino defendant. See generally Martha
Minow, Stripped Down Like A Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality
of Judges and Jurors, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1201 (1992) (arguing that the decision
wrongly implies that Latinos have sympathies in cases involving Latinos); see also Perea,
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eighty-four percent of all Latinos in Brooklyn, the trial site, spoke Span-
ish in their homes,' 22 thus leading to the conclusion that "[iln the Latino
community, ethnicity and language are inextricably intertwined. ' "'
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court plurality in Hernandez24 found it
unnecessary to address this pretextuality argument.'" Justice Kennedy,
writing the plurality opinion, defined a race neutral rationale as one
"based on something other than the race of the juror."' 26 Therefore, in
evaluating a proffered reason for a particular strike, the trial court should
examine the "facial validity" of the given explanation. 127 So long as "a
discriminatory intent is [not] inherent in the prosecutor's explanation,
the reason offered will be deemed race neutral."' 128
Had the prosecutor explained that he did not want any Spanish-speak-
ing jurors, the plurality opined, then a court could possibly find that this
explanation served as a pretext for discrimination. 2 9 However, the plu-
rality felt that "that case is not before us."' 30 Rather, the prosecutor in
Hernandez, "did not rely on language ability without more, but ex-
plained that the specific responses and the demeanor of the two individu-
als during voir dire caused him to doubt their ability to defer to the
official translation of Spanish-language testimony.""'c" Thus, the Her-
nandez Court concluded that the prosecutor's reasons for the strikes
were facially valid and did not evince an intent to exclude Latinos from
the jury. 132
The distinction between a challenge used due to a juror's proficiency in
Spanish and one exercised because of a perceived unwillingness by the
juror to faithfully accept an interpreter's translation is disingenuous. In-
deed, any juror proficient in Spanish would have responded to the prose-
cutor's questions concerning their bilingualism in exactly the same
manner since it would be impossible for the Spanish-speaking juror to
supra note 95, at 40-46 (refuting notion that Latino jurors will have an undue influence
on the jury).
122. See Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic
Groups From Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 761, 789 & n.85 (1993) (citing 1980 U.S.
Census).
123. Id. at 791; see also Perea, supra note 95, at 44 (stating that "Spanish-language
ability and Spanish-English bilingualism are inextricably interwoven with Latino or His-
panic origin").
124. Chief Justice William Rehnquist along with Justices White, Kennedy, and Souter
composed the plurality in Hernandez. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in
which Justice Scalia joined. Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Marshall dissented. Justice
Stevens wrote the dissent in which Justice Marshall joined while Justice Blackmun only
joined part of it.
125. See Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867.
126. Id. at 1866.
127. Id.
128. Id
129. See id. at 1873.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1867.
132. See id at 1867-68.
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ignore completely the actual testimony given in Spanish. 3 3 Hence, de-
spite the Supreme Court's statements to the contrary, the explanation
given by the prosecutor does have the effect of a "pure, language-based
reason."13' 4 And this the Supreme Court stated would have been an un-
acceptable rationale. 13" Thus, by mischaracterizing the reasons given in
Hernandez, the Supreme Court successfully averted the need to confront
the hard question of pretextuality. 136
As a result, the Court's decision in Hernandez actually encourages the
use of pretext. Indeed, Hernandez offers a limited view of the concept of
race neutrality. Arguably, potential racial surrogates-like language in
Hernandez or residence in Lynn 137-always can be described, at least
facially, as based on "something other than race."'' 38  Therefore, such
exclusions routinely will be accepted. So long as attorneys do not bla-
tantly discriminate, they can offer pretextual reasons confidently, know-
ing that courts will not delve beyond an explanation's facial validity.
And, consequently, the Batson decision is reduced "to a superficial check
only for the most egregious forms of discrimination."' 1
39
Moreover, Hernandez presents an excellent example of the havoc
pretextual reasoning can have on minority representation on the jury.
According to the 1990 census data, seventy-five percent of all Latinos
speak Spanish. " Thus, in cases where Spanish testimony will be intro-
duced into evidence, roughly three of four Latino jurors may be elimi-
nated from the venire solely because of their language abilities."i'
133. Indeed, the defendant attempted to make this point in his brief to the Court. See
id. at 1867. One commentator has noted that "following the prosecutor's instruction to
abide solely by the official English interpretation would have been as unnatural and im-
possible as asking them to stop breathing during the duration of the trial," Ramirez,
supra note 122, at 762.
134. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867. See generally Perea, supra note 95 (arguing that
the peremptory exclusion of bilingual jurors is not race neutral).
135. See id. at 1872-73. The Court stated:
We would face a quite different case if the prosecutor had justified his peremp-
tory challenges with the explanation that he did not want Spanish-speaking ju-
rors. It may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that
proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a sur-
rogate for race under an equal protection analysis.
Id.
Indeed, the Court has held language-based restrictions implicate the Equal Protection
Clause. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating law prohibiting the
teaching of languages other than English).
136. See Ramirez, supra note 122, at 806 (stating that the "Court ignored the factual
reality of the case and proclaimed that this case was about two individually deficient
responses").
137. See supra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
138. Hernandez, Ill S. Ct. at 1866.
139. Swift, supra note 96, at 356.
140. See Ramirez, supra note 122, at 762 & n.5 (citing 1990 U.S. Census).
141. The Hernandez plurality did state that evidence of such disparate impact "does
have relevance to the trial court's decision" on the question of race neutrality. Her-
nandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1868. Nonetheless, the Court ignored this statistical evidence of
potential Latino exclusion in Hernandez.
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"Obviously, Hernandez poses a threat to [Latino] persons' participation
as jurors" 142-clearly not a result intended by Batson. 43
B. The Lower Courts and Pretextuality
This Note divides pretextual reasoning into three distinct categories:
(1) explanations that serve as racial and ethnic surrogates, (2) reasons
that are based on unequal application between white jurors accepted and"
minority venirepersons peremptorily struck, and (3) rationales relying on
an attorneys' subjective impressions of a particular individual during voir
dire." A review of cases accepting reasons falling into these three cate-
gories will help outline the trouble lower courts are experiencing with
pretext.
1. Racial and Ethnic Surrogates
Courts repeatedly accept justifications based on nonracial characteris-
tics that are "such a close proxy for race [or ethnicity] that '[they] would
not supply a neutral explanation for challenging [minority] jurors.' "P145
Such racial surrogates are present when "there is an extraordinary and
dramatic statistical correlation between the trait and race, ethnicity, or
gender."" Thus, one commentator has used the term "super-corre-
lated" to describe these traits. 47 Indeed, these rationales, while facially
"race neutral,"'' 48 often exhibit, at best, tenuous reasoning, a far cry from
the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in Batson.149 Moreover,
the risk of pretext is great with an explanation which may also serve as a
proxy for race, as such rationales tend to eliminate large segments of the
minority population, regardless of the individual characteristics of a par-
ticular juror.I50
Residence provides a particularly good example of a racial surrogate.
142. Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism. Real-
ism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 419, 433 (1992).
143. As Justice Stevens' dissent stated, "[i]f any explanation, no matter how insubstan-
tial and no matter how great its disparate impact, could rebut a prima facie inference of
discrimination provided only that the explanation itself was not facially discriminatory,
'the Equal Protection Clause would be but a vain and illusory requirement."' Her-
nandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1876 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 98 (1986)).
144. See also Hopper, supra note 24, at 826-29 (creating three categories of classifica-
tion: a juror's connection to the case at bar, the juror and defendant share some nonra-
cial characteristic, and an attorney's subjective impressions).
145. Alschuler, supra note 40, at 175 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97
(1986)).
146. Ramirez, supra note 122, at 2 & n.8.
147. Id.
148. See Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991); see supra notes 126-28
and accompanying text (discussing race neutral requirement).
149. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 & n.20 (1986) (requiring a neutral expla-
nation to be both clear and specific as well as related to the particular case to be tried).
150. See Serr & Maney, supra note 95, at 53-54 (stating that "these facially neutral
reasons provide prosecutors with a 'cover' for racial discrimination").
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Especially in urban areas, residence often will correlate significantly with
either race or ethnicity.15 1 Indeed, as one court has noted, "[r]esidence
.. acts as an ethnic badge... [and] can be the most accurate predictor
of race." '52 Moreover, academic studies have concurred with this con-
clusion. 153 Nonetheless, courts routinely accept residence as a legitimate
excuse without the scrutiny the rationale warrants.
154
In United States v. Uwaezhoke,'55 a black defendant, on trial for his
participation in a heroin conspiracy, objected to the government's per-
emptory challenge of a black woman.156 In defending the strike, the
prosecutors stated that the prospective juror was a single parent with two
children, worked as a postal worker, and rented an apartment in the city
of Newark, New Jersey. 157 Thus, the cause for the strike, the prosecutors
explained, was that she might have been "involved in a drug situation
where she lives." 1 58 The district court accepted the proffered rationale
and denied the defendant's claim that the challenge was mere pretext.159
The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the peremptory strike was
"clearly race-neutral on its face.""
Uwaezhoke illustrates exactly the tenuous reasoning often underlying
challenges based on racial surrogates. Relying on the prospective juror's
occupation and residence, the prosecutors jumped to the conclusion that
151. Indeed, in many cities, neighborhoods are named, sometimes derogatorily, after
the race or ethnicity residing in them. For instance, New York City has Chinatown,
Little Italy, and Spanish Harlem. See Fodor's New York 8-9 (1991).
152. United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992).
153. See, e.g., Michael F. Potter, Note, Racial Diversity in Residential Communities:
Societal Housing Patterns and a Proposal for a "Racial Inclusionary Ordinance", 63 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1151, 1154 (1990) (finding that race determines housing patterns); Richard
H. Sander, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing,
82 N.W. U. L. Rev. 874, 875 (1988) (remarking that "[e]very major metropolitan area in
the U.S. still has a large ghetto; in many cities, over eighty percent of the black popula-
tion lives in virtually all-black neighborhoods").
154. See, e.g., Lynn v. Alabama, 493 U.S. 945, 946 (1989) (striking juror because of
residence acceptable); Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487, 489-90 (7th Cir. 1992) (ac-
cepting explanation that prospective juror lived in the same neighborhood as the crime
scene even though prospective juror indicated he had no previous knowledge of the
crime); United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243, 1247 (1Ith Cir. 1991) (holding strike
based on venireperson's residence near "a family the prosecutor had convicted on charges
of conspiracy to distribute five years earlier" legitimate; prosecutor reasonably may have
concluded that an "associational link" existed), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1279 (1992);
United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990) (approving strike of minority
venireperson who lived in vicinity of the homes of two government witnesses), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 863 (1990); United States v. Mitchell, 877 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1989)
(allowing strike of black jurors because they resided in a black Congressman's district);
Taitano v. Commonwealth, 358 S.E.2d 590 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (striking of juror who
resided near criminal defendant considered nonpretextual); see also supra notes 97-112
and accompanying text.
155. 995 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1993).
156. See id. at 389-90.
157. See id. at 391.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 393.
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"she may be living in a low-income area that has a drug problem."''
From this, the prosecutors then inferred that because one "lives in a poor
neighborhood in Newark... [the person must] have had personal exper-
iences with drug trafficking that would make their reaction to trial evi-
dence [in a drug case] unpredictable."'' 62 In an attempt to bolster their
contentions, the government's brief to the Third Circuit noted that New-
ark has an infamous "'reputation as a national leader in the areas of
drug crime and violent crimes.' "63
Even if the prosecutor made a bona fide assumption that this particu-
lar juror lived in a drug-infested area, the inference that she could not try
the case in an impartial manner does not necessarily follow. Indeed, the
reasons offered by the Third Circuit as to why the inference is logical
appear blatantly stereotypical. The court suggested that perhaps the
prosecutor "may rationally believe" that the struck juror would not have
convicted a black drug dealer for fear of either retaliation or an "unpleas-
ant contact with the police in the context of drug trafficking."'' This
kind of reasoning amounts to little more than an assumption that one
who lives in a black neighborhood cannot fairly try a black defendant.6 "
Moreover, during voir dire, neither of the two government attorneys
ever asked the venireperson a single question in an effort to corroborate
their assumptions.'66 Thus, they simply assumed that a black, single wo-
man living in Newark resided in low-income housing and, further, that
areas of low-income housing must experience drug problems.' 6' In other
words, the prosecutors simply equated low-income, black neighborhoods
with drug problems. Even worse, these stereotypes were judicially sanc-
tioned by both the trial and circuit court in accepting them as legitimate
reasons for striking the juror.168 Indeed, the Uwaezhoke panel stated that
counsel may "rely on educated guesses about probabilities based on their
limited knowledge of a particular juror and their own life
experiences." '1
69
However, when these educated guesses are nothing more than uncor-
roborated stereotypes, Batson v. Kentucky commands their prohibi-
161. Id at 400 (Pollack, J., dissenting).
162. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d at 394.
163. Id at 400 (Pollack, J., dissenting) (quoting Government's Brief to the Third Cir-
cuit, at 16).
164. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d at 394 n.5. This last inference is particularly troubling as it
suggests that perhaps a black woman, earning lower wages, somehow is involved with
drugs herself.
165. See Ex parte Lynn, 543 So. 2d 709, 715 (1988) (Jones, J., concurring specially)
("How long, oh, how long will we persist in the hollow notion that black jurors are less
likely to convict criminally accused black defendants than are white jurors to convict
white defendants?").
166. See Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d at 390-91.
167. See id at 393-94.
168. See id at 394.
169. Id at 394 n.5.
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tion. 7° As one court stated, "Through mental association, African-
Americans, their neighborhoods, crime and violence all become amalga-
mated, giving rise to tenacious stereotypes-innocent and unintentional
perhaps, but stereotypes nonetheless. They are and must remain unwel-
come in the courtroom."' 17 1
Furthermore, Uwaezhoke also indicates the impact that such racial
proxies can have on minority representation on the jury. The justifica-
tion given by the government easily could eliminate large segments of the
minority population. As Judge Pollack, dissenting in Uwaezhoke, com-
mented that while one cannot say with assurance what impact the exclu-
sion would have on the future compositions of juries, one can conclude
with "considerable confidence" that "such exclusion would, to a signifi-
cant degree, disproportionately disqualify black jurors."' 72 Thus, Judge
Pollack queried, "in a city which is 58.5% black, is the exclusion from
jury service in drug cases ... of all persons who live in a 'low-income
area' compatible with Batson?"'173
Religious activities provide yet another legitimate proxy for race.
United States v. Woods '74 involved a case in which the defendant, a black
minister from Charleston, South Carolina, was on trial for mail fraud.' 7 5
During jury selection, the United States attorney exercised four peremp-
tory challenges against black members of the venire. 76 On appeal, the
defendant challenged the district court's acceptance of the explanation
for one of the prospective jurors. 7 7 That juror, a black man also from
Charleston, was struck because "he frequently attended church and vis-
ited various churches in the Charleston area."'' 17  Thus, the prosecution
felt that "he may have been a constituent of the defendant." '
In affirming the district court's validation of the excuse, the Fourth
Circuit agreed that since the juror "stated he attended various churches
in the area, he could have attended the defendant's church."' 80 Signifi-
cantly, the government failed to ask the prospective juror if he ever had
170. See supra notes 22-50 and accompanying text.
171. United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992). In Bishop, the Ninth Cir-
cuit invalidated a peremptory challenge of a black woman. The challenge was explained
as due to the fact that she lived in Compton, a neighborhood in South Central, Los
Angeles. See id. at 825. Noting that seventy-five percent of Compton's residents were
black, the Bishop Court found the proffered reason acted as a discriminatory racial proxy.
See id. at 826. Indeed, the reason "amounted to little more than the assumption that one
who lives in an area heavily populated by poor black people could not fairly try a black
defendant." Id. at 825.
172. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d at 401 (Pollack, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 403.
174. 812 F.2d 1483 (4th Cir. 1987).
175. See id. at 1484.
176. See id. at 1485.
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1487.
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actually attended the church where the defendant preached."8 ' Thus, the
court permitted the following assumption to be made: since a black
venireperson attends church, it follows that the church must have a black
minister. Such tenuous inferences cannot be considered legitimate as
they amount to nothing more than unconfirmed stereotypes.
Furthermore, religious activities have the potential to eliminate large
numbers of minorities, regardless of a venireperson's individual charac-
teristics. Thus, in United States v. Clemmons, 8 2 a prosecutor struck a
venireperson because he felt that the juror, whose last name was Das,
was "'probably Hindu in religion;'" and, Hindus "'may have religious
beliefs that may affect [the juror's] thinking.' "183 This rationale was ac-
cepted by the trial court and subsequently afflirmed, Strikingly, how-
ever, the prosecutor never asked the venireperson if he was Hindu.'
Moreover, as nearly all Hindus are of Indian origin,8 6 the Third Circuit
effectively gives attorneys a license to exclude a large segment of the
Asian Indian population."8 7
Membership in a group traditionally associated with minorities is an
additional example in this category. In United States v. Payne,18 for ex-
ample, a black defendant in a criminal trial objected to the prosecutor's
striking of two jurors because of their race.'8 9 In rebutting the prima
facie case of discrimination, the government argued that the reason for
the challenges was that the two individuals were associated with two
black activist groups, the NAACP and the Black Caucus. 9° The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's acceptance of the proffered reasons,
holding that "the distinction the government drew between the race of
the two individuals who were excused and the affiliations and activities of
these two individuals" was legitimate.' 9 ' This distinction, however,
seems to ignore the fact that membership in these groups strongly corre-
181. See id at 1485.
182. 892 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990).
183. Id at 1156.
184. See id at 1157.
185. See id. at 1156. Moreover, even if the juror was Hindu, one must wonder how
that "affect[s] his thinking," id, especially, in a case where the defendant was on trial for
selling stolen treasury bonds. See id at 1154. This justification certainly does not seem
"related to the particular facts in the case to be tried." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
98 (1986).
186. Id. at 1161 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). Indeed, "in common usage the word
'Hindu,' in addition to identifying the religious faith, has often served as a shorthand
reference to Asian Indians." Id at 1161 n.8.
187. Another example is the elimination of Latino jurors due to their Catholicism. See
Perea, supra note 95, at 18. Catholicism is considered an integral part of the Latino
identity. See id Indeed, some 80 to 95% of all Latinos consider themselves Catholics.
See id. at 18 n.87.
188. 962 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 306 (1992).
189. See id, at 1233.
190. See id
191. Id.
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lates with race.192 Thus, the danger of pretext should not have been re-
jected so readily.
Closely related to racial surrogates are those reasons likely to result in
a disproportionate number of minority persons being excluded from the
jury. Indeed, like the excuse based on racial surrogates, these type of
strikes, while facially race neutral, can easily serve as pretext for racial
discrimination. Furthermore, rarely will these rationales have any legiti-
mate relation to the facts of the particular case to be tried.193 Thus, the
Hernandez Court stated that "disparate impact should be given appro-
priate weight in determining whether" a prima facie case has been
rebutted. 194
Frequent excuses that fall into this sub-grouping are unemploy-
ment,' 95 lack of substantial income, 196 insufficient education, 197 and rela-
tives with criminal records.' 98 Moreover, these reasons tend to become
magnified in urban areas "where the burden of unemployment, low in-
come, or poor education is likely to fall disproportionately upon minori-
ties."' 9 9 Indeed, commentators have noted that black neighborhoods in
cities tend to lack employment opportunities and have inferior schools,
increased criminal activities and higher poverty rates.2° Thus, exclu-
192. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was founded in
1909 with the explicit purpose of "advanc[ing] the interests of colored citizens."
NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 735 F.2d 131, 132 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985). As one commentator has noted, the NAACP is primarily
considered a "black group." Roger Alan Stone, The Mass Plaintiff. Public Interest Law,
Direct Mail Fundraising and the Donor/Client, 25 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 197, 206
n.62 (1992).
193. See Serr & Maney, supra note 95, at 54; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
98 (1986) (discussing requirements for rebuttal).
194. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1867 (1991). However, disparate im-
pact, consistent with the Supreme Court's Equal Protection analysis, will not be disposi-
tive of racially discriminatory intent. See id. at 1867-68.
195. See infra notes 202-10 and accompanying text.
196. As one judge has noted, "[u]nhappily, 'poverty level' correlates closely with
race." United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 400 (3d Cir. 1993) (Pollack, J., dis-
senting). For a case invoking this explanation, see United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d
1064, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987). In Cartlidge, a prospective juror was stricken because his low
income occupation might have allowed him to identify with a black defendant on trial for
charges relating to the defendant's participation in a drug conspiracy. See id. at 1070.
Apparently, the prosecutor assumed that the prospective black juror's low-income status
would cause that juror to relate to the black defendant's presumable need for money.
This assumption is dubious at best. See id.; Serr & Maney, supra note 95, at 45-46 n.249.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1992) (accepting
challenges of two jurors due to their low-level of education); United States v. Hinojosa,
958 F.2d 624, 631-32 (5th Cir. 1992) (approving exclusion of three blacks on the venire
because of insufficient education).
198. See, e.g, United States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1992) (allowing
strike of a potential black juror with a cousin who had served two years in jail for a drug
conviction despite fact that juror stated she would have no trouble being fair and impar-
tial); United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding legitimate
where juror struck because her brother was once convicted of a crime).
199. See Serr & Maney, supra note 95, at 54.
200. See Potter, supra note 153, at 1176-78; Sander, supra note 153, at 875.
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sions producing a disparate impact upon minorities deserve heightened
scrutiny.
Perhaps most troubling are the cases involving unemployment, a
somewhat frequent excuse.201 United States v. Ferguson2 o2 provides an
excellent illustration as to why such heightened scrutiny is merited. In
Ferguson, a black defendant stood trial for possession of an illegal fire-
arm.2 3 During voir dire, the prosecutor supplied unemployment as his
rationale for striking both a black male and a black female from the
jury.2' While noting the "reasons may appear insubstantial,"2 5 the Sev-
enth Circuit nonetheless affirmed the district court's acceptance of the
given explanation. 20 6 However, one must (and the trial court necessarily
should have) question the connection between an unemployed juror and
a black defendant illegally possessing a gun.207 Moreover, labor statistics
for Chicago, the site of the trial, indicated that 18.8% of all black males
and 14.8% of all black females were unemployed in the year of the
trial.20 8 Thus, roughly one of every five black males and one of every
seven black females "were denied the honor and privilege of jury duty"
simply for being black and unemployed. °9
Indeed, in cases where racial surrogates, and their disparate impact
counterparts, are employed, courts should use extreme caution in analyz-
ing them. Both merit special scrutiny as they are inherently suspect of
serving as mere pretext. Therefore, attorneys should be required during
voir dire to bring out those facts which support the rationales for their
strikes. Moreover, courts need to ensure that given explanations ration-
ally relate to the case before them. Without these preventative measures,
Batson cannot succeed.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 914 F.2d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 1990) (allowing
strike of one black juror to stand due to individual's unemployment); United States v.
Moreno, 878 F.2d 817, 820 (5th Cir.) (accepting as legitimate peremptory challenges of
two black females and one Latino male due to their unemployed status), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 979 (1989); United States v. Ross, 872 F.2d 249, 250 (striking of two unemployed
prospective jurors valid).
202. 935 F.2d 862 (7th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 907 (1992).
203. See id at 863.
204. See id at 864.
205. Iad at 865.
206. See id. at 865-66.
207. As Judge Cudahy stated in his concurrence, "[u]nless we are to assume that youth
[a reason for another strike] and unemployment are universally plausible reasons for jury
strikes, there should be some indication of a nexus between the crime charged and the
characteristics of the challenged juror." Id at 867 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
208. See Geographic Profiles of Employment and Unemployment, 1990, Bureau of La-
bor Statistics, June 1991, at 92. The unemployment rates for white males and white
females were 3.9% and 4.5% respectively. See id.
209. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1369 (1991). In Jackson, supra note 202, a
similar impact is achieved. In St. Louis, site of the trial, 14.5% of all black women were
unemployed. See Geographic Profiles of Employment and Unemployment. 1989. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, May 1990, at 101.
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2. Uneven Application
The second grouping of cases involves those in which the courts accept
a given rationale for a strike of a minority juror even though white jurors
exhibiting the same characteristics which prompted the peremptory
strike remain unchallenged and thus are allowed on the jury. In United
States v. Alvarado,210 for example, the prosecutor challenged four black
venirepersons in the trial of a black man accused of extortion.2 1 As to
one of the strikes, the prosecutor explained that the prospective juror had
children the same age as the defendant and therefore "might be unduly
sympathetic."'21 2 The defendant, however, argued these reasons were
pretextual as the prosecutor failed to peremptorily challenge white mem-
bers of the venire with children the same age as the defendant.21 3 During
the Batson inquiry, the prosecutor even admitted his failure to challenge
white jurors with this characteristic. 214 Nevertheless, the trial court ac-
cepted the proffered rationale and the Second Circuit affirmed. 21 5 Fur-
thermore, the Second Circuit noted that while the given rationale
appeared "dubious, ' 21 6 it should not be rejected "simply because it ap-
plies to a non-minority venireperson who was not challenged. '217
Pretext, however, is much more likely when unequal application of a
"peremptory policy" is demonstrated.218 Indeed, as one circuit court has
observed, "[w]hat constitutes a neutral explanation is a question of com-
parability .... In order to have a neutral explanation, the characteristics
of the struck individual cannot be present in those white panel members
not struck. 21 9 Thus, courts should not accept rationales when white
jurors are not subjected to the same criteria.
In Jones v. Ryan,220 the Third Circuit invalidated a peremptory chal-
lenge for just this reason. In Jones, a twenty-three year-old defendant
was on trial for robbery and assault.22 The prosecutor, using his per-
emptory challenges, eliminated three of the four black venirepersons dur-
ing voir dire.222 As to the first juror struck, the prosecutor explained that
it was his "general policy" to use his challenges to eliminate potential
jurors with children the same age as the defendant.223 The second strike
210. 951 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1991).
211. See id. at 23-24.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 25.
214. See id. Indeed, the prosecutor attempted to argue that the government had
"other reasons for challenging" the juror but specified none. Id. Calling this attempt
"lame," the Second Circuit rejected this "factor." Id.
215. See id. at 26.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 25.
218. Serr & Maney, supra note 95, at 57.
219. United States v. Wilson, 853 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1988).
220. 987 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1993).
221. See id. at 962.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 964.
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was used against a young juror. In support of this strike, the prosecutor
expressed a policy that "if it's a white defendant, a green defendant, a red
defendant, black defendant, if there's a potential juror of the same ap-
proximate age and race as the defendant... I will keep them off the
jury." '224 Finally, the prosecutor challenged the third juror for failure to
make eye contact.2 5
On appeal, the defense objected to the acceptance of these rationales
by arguing they were pretextual. Indeed, despite the prosecutor's general
policy of striking jurors with children of an age similar to the defendant,
the record revealed that two white venirepersons had children of an age
approximately the same as the defendant.226 Furthermore, while the
prosecutor also alleged a policy of striking jurors the same age as a de-
fendant, the record showed that three whites went unchallenged even
though their ages were roughly the same as the defendant. 227 Noting
that the prosecutor's general policies were "discarded where the
venirepersons were white,"" 8 the Third Circuit held the challenges to be
pretextual and reversed." 9
While some courts also have nullified strikes because of unequal appli-
cation of a given rationale,230 others still persist in accepting the such
strikes regardless of evidence of this type of pretext."' Contributing to
this problem is the fact that records rarely reflect what transpired during
voir dire as accurately as did the record in Jones.23 2 Thus, in United
224. Id
225. See id. This challenge was not discussed on appeal. See id. at 974; see also infra
notes 236-60 and accompanying text (discussing this type of subjective strike).
226. See Jones, 987 F.2d at 973.
227. See id at 973-74.
228. Id at 974.
229. See id. at 975.
230. See, eg., United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) (nullify-
ing strike of Hispanic person because prosecutor gave juror's residence in La Mesa, Cali-
fornia as reason, but failed to strike a white juror who also resided in La Mesa).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 1991) (accepting
proffered rationale of youth even though nineteen-year-old white juror was accepted);
United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 1991) (accepting rationale for
strike of a black woman because of a previous association with defense counsel, despite
fact that several white jurors also had contact with defense counsel), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1279 (1992); United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1551 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowing
youth, unemployment, and relatives with drug convictions as reasons for strikes of black
venirepersons regardless of fact that one white juror was young and unemployed and
another had been convicted of drug charges); Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644,
648-49 (11th Cir. 1990) (deeming acceptable a strike of a black woman for being em-
ployed by school board while two white women also employed by school board were not
stricken), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2263 (1991); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362,
1367 n.5 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding no pretext in challenges to potential black jurors based
on age, family drug problems, and misunderstanding voir dire questions even though
prosecutor did not strike white jurors exhibiting the same characteristics); United States
v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding strike of black venireperson non-
pretextual even though white juror exhibited the same characteristics of being young and
single).
232. See supra notes 220-29 and accompanying text.
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States v. Bennett,23 3 in part because a white juror with a family member
convicted of a drug offense could not be identified in the transcript, an
attempted comparison between black venirepersons struck due to their
relatives having drug-related convictions and the accepted white jurors
with this characteristic failed.2 34  To prevent unequal application of
strikes, courts should expect that if, as an attorney claims, a minority
venireperson is excluded for having a particular attribute, then white
venirepersons possessing the same characteristic similarly should be chal-
lenged. Courts cannot continue to ignore the significant likelihood that
pretext exists when attorneys fail to do so.
3. Subjective Impressions
This last category of cases includes those in which a court accepts ex-
planations based on an attorney's subjective impressions of a juror. For
example, Barfield v. Orange County,23 s the plaintiff brought a Section
1983236 and Title V11 237 action against her employer, the Orange County
Sheriff.238 The plaintiff, a black woman, claimed she was fired from her
job as a corrections officer due to her race.239 During voir dire, the de-
fense challenged the only two black women on the venire. 4° One juror,
the prosecutor explained, was struck because she "was looking at me,
and looking at my client, and looking at the defendant's table with an
expression that conveyed to me some hostility, and it was my gut feeling,
based on her facial expression that she was likely to not be fair and im-
partial to the Sheriff., 241  The trial court accepted this rationale and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that "hostile facial expressions and
body language are legitimate" reasons for a strike.242
Appellate courts have accepted a multitude of such subjective-impres-
sion explanations. In addition to strikes for perceived hostility,243 courts
have allowed strikes of jurors due to attorney impressions of their de-
meanor, 2" their attitude,245 their dress, 2 46 and inattentiveness during voir
233. 928 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1991).
234. See id. at 1151.
235. 911 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2263 (1991).
236. 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e. (1988).
238. See Barfield, 911 F.2d at 645.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 646.
241. Id. The other juror was challenged because of a family member who had a crimi-
nal record. See id.
242. Id. at 648.
243. See Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1060 (1993) (hostility); United States v. Todd, 963 F.2d 207, 211 (8th Cir. 1992) (hostil-
ity); United States v. Matthews, 803 F.2d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 1986) (hostility), rev'd on
other grounds, 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
244. See United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir. 1988) (demeanor);
United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1987) (demeanor).
245. See Brown, 973 F.2d at 119 (juror not serious in responding to questions); United
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dire.247 Moreover, a juror's facial expressions,248 eye contact, 249 nervous-
ness, 250 and tone of voice.. all have been considered valid reasons as
well. Indeed, in one case, a juror's "slouching" resulted in his being pe-
remptorily challenged.252
Subjective explanations prove problematic in that these types of rea-
sons easily mask discriminatory motives, making them subject to abuse.
An attorney wishing to keep minorities off the jury can simply provide
the court with a subjective rationale based on an unverifiable impression.
Since judges usually remain unaware of a particular juror mannerisms,
"trial courts are ill-equipped to second-guess [these] reasons."" 3 Indeed,
how can a judge know if the juror actually expressed negative "body
language '  or if a juror "spent a great deal of time examining me?" '255
Moreover, a written record will not reflect such subjective opinions, thus
making an appeal of these challenges much more difficult.
As Justice Marshall noted, in his concurrence to Batson, "outright pre-
varication [is not] the only danger here." '256 Racist attitudes of both at-
torneys and judges alike, either consciously or unconsciously, may
contribute to their discriminatory characterization of minority jurors.257
Because" 'seat-of-the-pants instincts' may often be just another term for
racial prejudice," '258 impression-based explanations need heightened scru-
States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 928 (1987) (poor
attitude).
246. See United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 323-24 (juror dressed like a "rock
star"); see also Alschuler, supra note 40, at 174 n.85 (citing cases).
247. See generally United States v. Sherrills, 929 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1991) (striking
three jurors for inattentiveness); United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1990)
(inattentiveness).
248. See United States v. Hendrieth, 922 F.2d 748, 749-50 (11th Cir. 1991) (rubbing
and rolling her eyes); United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501, 506 (2d Cir. 1990) (facial
expressions).
249. See Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 967 F.2d 1121, 1124-25 (7th Cir.
1992) (looking sympathetically at plaintiff); Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506, 512 (8th
Cir. 1991) (staring at defense attorney); United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1071
(5th Cir. 1987) (avoiding eye contact with attorney).
250. See Brown v. Kelly 973 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1992) (juror appeared nervous),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1060 (1993).
251. See id. (stating juror was "timid in speaking").
252. Reynolds, 931 F.2d at 510 (commenting that juror also looked bored, disinter-
ested, and hostile). See also United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 95 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1988) (striking juror who exhibited negative body language).
253. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). See also
Serr & Maney, supra note 95, at 59 n.317 ("It is very unlikely that a trial judge can
remember all the idiosyncracies exhibited by the prospective jurors during voir dire, espe-
cially when the [attorney] gives his explanation, if at all, subsequent to the questioning of
all venirepersons."); Swift, supra note 96, at 362 (calling these "soft-data" explanations
"unimpeachable").
254. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d at 95 n.1.
255. United States v. Matthews, 803 F.2d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
256. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
257. See id.
258. Id.
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tiny;259 yet, courts routinely accept them without it.
III. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: LEGAL ETHICS
Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny 26° impose a Herculean task upon
the courts. Together, the decisions force trial judges to assess the mo-
tives of attorneys exercising peremptory challenges against potential mi-
nority jurors. As Justice Marshall commented, the "implicit assumption
[of Batson] that courts are capable" of evaluating such challenges for
alleged racial discrimination is Batson's "greatest flaw."' 261 Indeed, the
emerging case law is proving Justice Marshall correct.262
Through the use of pretextual reasoning, attorneys remain free to
strike jurors predicated on clear, yet sometimes subtle, racial stereotypes.
With courts either unable263 (or unwilling264) to detect such race-based
challenges, racism still permeates the jury selection process. As one
judge has noted, Batson's "cumulative record causes me to pause and
wonder whether the principles enunciated in Batson are being under-
mined by excuses that have all form and no substance. ' '265 If this pretex-
tual loophole is allowed to remain open, Justice Marshall's looming
prediction that Batson will provide only an "illusory" protection will be-
come reality.266
A. Closing the Loophole: Current Proposals
It has been suggested that "[s]o long as peremptory challenges are per-
mitted, trial and appellate judges will continue to have difficulty in ascer-
taining whether.., motives in exercising peremptory challenges are good
259. But see generally Swift, supra note 96 (calling for total elimination of these subjec-
tive explanations).
260. See supra Part I.
261. Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
262. See supra Part II.
263. As Justice Marshall stated in his concurrence to Batson, "[a] judge's own con-
scious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation as well sup-
ported .... Even if all parties approach the Court's mandate with the best of conscious
intentions, that mandate requires them to confront and overcome their own racism on all
levels-a challenge I doubt all of them can meet." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106
(1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Developments In the Law-Race and the
Criminal Process, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1472, 1581 (1988) ("Moreover, in part because the
prosecutor's prejudice might be subtle, unconscious, and shared by the judge, the prose-
cutor may be able to articulate non-racial explanations that the judge would find
reasonable.").
264. Judge Higginbotham states that "I have been... disturbed ... by a series of other
cases where the Batson issue has been raised and where superficial or almost frivolous
excuses for peremptory challenges with racial overtones have been proffered and accepted
.... [C]ourts must take seriously our responsibilit[ies] [under Batson]." United States v.
Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1159, 1163 (3d Cir. 1989) (Higginbotham, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 496 U.S.927 (1990).
265. Id. at 1162.
266. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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or bad."267 Thus, some argue that only the total elimination of the per-
emptory challenge will solve the problem of pretextual reasoning. Justice
Marshall in his concurrence in Batson advocated such an approach, call-
ing for a complete ban on the peremptory challenge.268 Several commen-
tators have supported this position as well.269
The interests in saving the peremptory challenge, however, make this
alternative both unlikely and unattractive. Although the Constitution
does not guarantee the use of peremptory challenges, they remain, none-
theless, "one of the most important of the rights secured" to a party in a
court.270 Not only does the challenge have a "venerable tradition in this
country, ' 27 1 the challenge serves a vital function. Peremptory challenges
weed out biased jurors to the benefit of both sides.272 Perhaps more im-
portant, though, the peremptory challenge allows litigants to believe that
their cases are being tried by an impartial jury.2 3 Thus, the Supreme
Court has stated that the challenge must be viewed as "essential to the
fairness of trial by jury."27 4
Others propose "expand[ing] upon the foundation[s]" of Batson to bol-
ster its effectiveness.27 5 One such approach would limit the number of
peremptory challenges allocated to each side.27 6 Thus, by reducing the
267. Clemmons, 892 F.2d at 1162 n.10 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
268. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The inherent potential of
peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by permitting the exclusion ofjurors on
racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal jus-
tice system.").
269. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 40, at 209; McMillan & Petrini, supra note 93, at
374; Van Dyke, supra note 6, at 167-69.
270. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting United States v. Pointer,
151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)). See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(stating that unexplained peremptories have been regarded as a way to strengthen the
jury system).
271. Batson, 476 U.S. at 120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "The peremptory challenge
has been in use without scrutiny into its basis for nearly as long as juries have existed."
Id at 119. For a detailed discussion of the history of the peremptory challenge, see Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-16 (1965) (tracing history of challenge from its develop-
ment in English trials through its acceptance in American courts).
272. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 118-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Long ago it was recog-
nized that '[t]he right of challenge is almost essential for the purpose of securing perfect
fairness and impartiality in a trial.' ") (quoting W. Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 175(1852)); Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (stating that one of "[t]he function[s] of the challenge is
... to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides"); see also Babcock, supra note 6, at
552-56 (discussing function of peremptory as a means of preserving fairness in our judi-
cial system).
273. See Babcock, supra note 6, at 552 (stating that "the jury not only should be fair
and impartial, but should seem to be so to those whose fortunes are at issue"); see also
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (commenting that "[t]he peremptory satisfies the rule that 'to
perform its high function in the best way, "justice must satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice" ' ") (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
274. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892). See also Swain, 380 U.S. at 219
("The persistence of peremptories and their extensive use demonstrate the long and
widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury.").
275. Hopper, supra note 24, at 836.
276. See id ; Van Dyke, supra note 6, at 169.
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chance of eliminating each minority member of the venire, the
probability of a heterogenous jury substantially increases. This ap-
proach, however, is problematic. A party only needs a small number of
challenges to eliminate minority venirepersons when only a few minority
members are represented on the venire in the first place. 277 Another vari-
ation on this position suggests limiting the number of strikes to a percent-
age of the number of minority members on the venire, in effect creating a
situation where neither party can produce an all-white jury.278 However,
this approach fails to take into account that some peremptory challenges
legitimately remove biased jurors, regardless of their race.
One district judge recently tried a novel approach to the problem.
During voir dire, an attorney exercised her peremptory challenges against
the only two black jurors on the venire. 79 Upon the judge's request for a
non-racial reason for the two challenges, the lawyer responded that one
strike removed a juror receiving disability payments while the other elim-
inated a juror serving as an employee for a school board. 280 The attor-
ney, however, had left unchallenged a white female juror who served on a
school board and a white male juror employed as a teacher; thus, sug-
gesting that the proffered reason was mere pretext.281 Noting the "incon-
sistent and somewhat evasive explanations" for the challenges, the trial
court judge concluded that they were racially-motivated and proceeded
to impose sanctions on the attorney.282
Monetary sanctions will not prove an effective deterrent, either. To
impose such sanctions, courts will continue to be burdened with the re-
sponsibility of evaluating challenges for possible racial motivation, a task
they apparently are not well-suited to perform. Moreover, one need turn
only to the mass of Rule 11 jurisprudence to discover the problems inher-
ent in this approach.283
B. Another Alternative: An Ethical Rule
The proposals discussed above rely almost exclusively on the courts to
277. Indeed in the Rodney King trial, which took place in the mostly all-white Ven-
tura County, the venire included only five black members. After challenges for cause,
only three potential black jurors remained. All three were struck by defense counsel. See
Barbara A. Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Service, 61 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 1139, 1140-41 n.6 (1992).
278. See Hopper, supra note 24, at 837.
279. See Deborah Pines, Lawyer Fined For Improper Jury Practice; Race-Based Chal-
lenges Incur Judge's Sanction, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 24, 1992, at I (discussing case of Pueblo v.
Supermarkets General before Judge Louis Freeh).
280. See id. Apparently, the attorney felt the juror's employment suggested a "liberal
bent." Id.
281. See id.
282. Id. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Southern District's Local Rule 4(k),
Judge Freeh fined the attorney for court costs for the 39 jurors on the venire at $40 a day
for a total of $1,560. See id.
283. See generally Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are
Going, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 475, 480-82 (1991) (discussing criticisms of Rule 11 including
the "avalanche of satellite litigation").
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remedy the pretextual problem. However, the courts, most notably the
Supreme Court, have shown a reluctance to undertake such a responsi-
bility. With this in mind, this Note proposes another option: shifting the
onus of countering the use of pretextual reasoning from the courts to the
legal profession through the implementation of an ethical rule. If the
Batson mandate is to be achieved, not only must courts scrutinize prof-
fered reasons more carefully, 284 but attorneys must recognize their obli-
gation not to offer pretextual rationales in the first place as well. An
ethical rule would serve this function.
1. A Proposed Ethical Rule
The following rule and comment could be incorporated into the Amer-
ican Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
RULE 3.1.5 Conduct During Jury Selection 8 '
A lawyer shall not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, religion, or
national origin against a member of the venire during jury selection.
COMMENT:
Discrimination in the jury selection process has no place in our judicial
process. The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges not only
harms litigants and the excluded juror but undermines public confi-
dence in our judicial system.28 6 Thus, a lawyer exercising peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner2 8 7 suggests an inability to fulfill
the lawyer's professional role as a public citizen concerned with the
fair administration of justice.
2. Justification for the Rule
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct,""' promulgated by the
American Bar Association, dictate the ethical norms of lawyering.28 9
284. See United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1163 (3d Cir. 1989) (Higginbot-
ham, J., concurring) (arguing that "courts must take seriously our responsibility to deter-
mine whether the justification ... makes sense in light of the facts giving rise to an
inference of discrimination"), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990).
285. The proposed ethical rule could have fallen under either Section 3, dealing with
the lawyer's responsibilities as an advocate, or Section 8, discussing the lawyer's responsi-
bilities in maintaining the integrity of the profession. Section 3 seems a more appropriate
place for the proposed rule as it concerns the lawyer's duties at trial. Section 8, on the
other hand, addresses the conduct of lawyers outside the courtroom.
286. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-88 (1986) (discussing these harms).
287. Such discrimination would include the use of pretextual reasoning. See supra
Part II.B.
288. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter Model Rules) replaced the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1983. See Geoffrey C. Hazard & Susan P.
Koniak, The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 12-14 (1990) (discussing evolution of ethical
codes in American lawyering). As of 1992, forty-one states have adopted the Model
Rules or some form of it. See ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct
§ 01:3-4 (1992).
289. See Model Rules Preamble ("Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are
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These rules define "the minimally acceptable behavior for lawyers." '29
Ideally, failure to comply with these enunciated principles will result in a
lawyer subjecting herself to disciplinary action by the governing entity.29I
The ethical rules, however, provide more than just simple regulation of
the attorney's professional behavior. Perhaps more importantly, the ethi-
cal rules outline the symbolic aspirations of the entire profession.292
Lawyers, as principal participants, possess a special duty in promoting
the "efficacy and legitimacy" of our judicial system.293 Thus, a central
and overriding goal of the legal profession concerns ensuring "the impar-
tial and efficient administration of justice. ' 294 Certainly the Preamble to
the Model Rules stresses this ideal. Indeed, the Preamble asserts that:
A lawyer is ... a public citizen having special responsibility for the
quality of justice.
A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes
and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate
respect for the legal system and for those who serve it....
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the
administration of justice and the quality of the service rendered by the
legal profession.... A lawyer should be mindful of the deficiencies in
the administration of justice....
Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment
of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship
to our legal system.
295
Moreover, several of the individual rules seek to promote these objec-
tives.296 Thus, the Model Rules prohibit lawyers from filing frivolous
and meritless claims, 297 from delaying litigation,2 98 from failing to dis-
prescribed in the Rules."); Model Rules Scope ("The Rules simply provide a framework
for the ethical practice of law.").
290. Naomi Cahn, A Preliminary Feminist Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 23, 29 (1990).
291. See Model Rules Scope ("Compliance with the Rules ... depends ... when neces-
sary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings."); see also Hazard & Koniak,
supra note 289, at 906-10 (discussing disciplinary procedures).
292. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev.
589, 647 (1985) (arguing "the most significant function of official codes will be sym-
bolic"); Cahn, supra note 291, at 29.
293. Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Profes-
sional Codes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 707 (1981); see Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers
of the Court, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 39, 43 (1989).
294. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 294, at 707.
295. Model Rules Preamble.
296. See Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 294, at 707 (discussing rules prohib-
iting "misrepresentations in negotiations, unfounded pleadings, and subornation of per-
jury" as promoting justice).
297. See Model Rules Rule 3.1.
298. See Model Rules Rule 3.2. The comment to Rule 3.2 states that "[d]ilatory prac-
tices bring the administration of justice into disrepute." Model Rules Rule 3.2 cmt.
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close adverse legal authority to the tribunal,2 9 9 from offering false or tam-
pered with evidence,co and from seeking to influence impermissibly
either a judge or juror.3 1
Hence, the Model Rules seek to protect the public, preserve the integ-
rity of the legal profession, and sustain public confidence in the profes-
sion as well as in the judicial system. A specific ethical rule forbidding
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges (including those offered
under the guise of pretext) would further manifest the legal profession's
commitment to these principles. By remaining silent on the issue,3"2
however, the legal community renders an enormous disservice not only
to itself but also to the general public.3 °3 Silence "suggest[s] that [the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges] raise[s] no significant ethi-
cal problems.""a  Clearly, this is not the case.
Employing the peremptory challenge to eliminate minority participa-
tion flies in the face of the tenets enunciated by the Model Rules. Indeed,
"racial neutrality in jury selection is... vital to the integrity" of our
judicial system."30 5 Discrimination in the selection of jurors creates an
appearance of bias and "undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of
299. See Model Rules Rule 3.3. Indeed, the comment to the Rule states that a "legal
argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward
the tribunal." Model Rules Rule 3.3 cmt.
300. See Model Rules Rule 3.3.
301. See Model Rules Rule 3.5.
302. The Model Rules consists of eight rules concerning the lawyer's responsibilities as
an advocate. Notably, not one addresses jury selection. See Model Rules Rules 3.1-3.8.
Indeed, the closest the Model Rules come to dealing with the topic can be found in
either Rule 4.4, concerning respect for the rights of third parties, see Model Rules Rule
4.4, or in Rule 8.4(d) under the heading of misconduct by "engag[ing] in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice." Model Rules Rule 8.4(d).
However, Rule 4.4 attempts to prevent a lawyer from "embarrass[ing], delay[ing] or
burden[ing] a third person." Model Rules Rule 4.4. While the comment indicates a law-
yer may not "disregard the rights of third persons," it seems quite a stretch to interpret
this Rule as embracing a ban on discrimination in jury selection. See Model Rules Rule
4.4 cmt.
Rule 8.4(d) fails to cover discrimination in jury selection as well. As the comment to
the Rule indicates, the Rule was designed primarily to address offenses "involving vio-
lence, dishonesty or breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of
justice." Model Rules Rule 8.4(d) cmt. This Rule does not seem to cover the use of
peremptory challenges to discriminate. Even if the Rule could be so construed, it is
doubtful the Rule covers the use of pretextual reasoning. The comment modifies the
ethical obligation by stating that "[a] lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation...
upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists." Id. Currently, with the use of
pretextual reasoning being routinely accepted by courts, it does not seem to cross the
bounds of the law.
303. See Richard A. Matasar, Teaching Ethics in Civil Procedure Courses, 39 J. Legal
Educ. 587, 588 n.5 (1989) (writing that "the failure to face up to the many troubling
aspects of lawyering does not serve either the profession or individual lawyers well").
304. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L. Rev.
639, 644 (1981).
305. United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1163 (3d Cir. 1989) (Higginbotham,
J., concurring), cert denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990).
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our system of justice."3 6 Moreover, when discriminatory practices are
tolerated in our judicial system, they provide "a stimulant" to racial prej-
udice in other facets of our society.30 7 Thus, an ethical rule symbolically
"serves a significant expressive function" 3°0 -it evidences the legal pro-
fession's acknowledgement of an egregious problem within our judicial
system and, more importantly, a commitment to contributing to its
solution.
This ethical rule would help to "persuade the general public that prac-
tioners are especially deserving of confidence, respect, and substantial
renumeration. ' ' 309 In this respect, the code of ethics can be likened to a
contract.310 Society "negotiates a deal with the profession: the society
will confer the benefits and privileges of a legal monopoly upon the group
in return for a promise of public service, i.e., a promise to carry on pro-
fessional practice in accordance with high standards of performance, for
the public good., 31 1 Ethical rules collectively serve as the benchmark for
the public to evaluate their bargain.31 2
By codifying an ethical rule banning racial discrimination in the exer-
cise of the peremptory challenge, the legal profession demonstrates its
willingness to uphold this societal bargain. Indeed, the legal community,
through the proposed Rule, will alleviate societal concerns about the fair-
ness of the judicial system and the protection of innocent persons,
306. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). Worse yet is the tremendous costs of
violence that flows as a direct result of discriminatory selection procedures. See Georgia
v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (1992) ("The need for public confidence is especially
high in cases involving race-related crimes. In such cases, emotions in the affected com-
munity will inevitably be heated and volatile. Public confidence in the integrity of the
criminal justice system is essential for preserving community peace."). Indeed, indicative
of this is the rioting after the jury returned not-guilty verdicts in the trial of the officers
accused of beating Rodney King. There, the urban unrest "stemm[ed] in part from what
many saw as the verdict's statement of racial injustice in the American judicial system."
Michael J. Desmond, Limiting a Defendant's Peremptory Challenges: Georgia v. McCol-
lum and the Problematic Extension of Equal Protection, 42 Cath. U.L. Rev 389, 390
(1993). See also Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Rein-
forcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1807, 1810 (1993) (describing
unfairness of the verdicts).
Another example of such violence followed the not-guilty verdicts in the 1980 trial of
four white police officers accused of beating a black motorist in Miami. See Smoke Sig-
nals From Miami, The Economist, May 24, 1980, at 35; Alschuler, supra note 40, at 195-
96 (discussing Miami riots).
307. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87-88 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1880)).
308. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 294, at 697.
309. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 294, at 693.
310. See Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 7,
12-13 (1989).
311. Id. at 13.
312. See id. See also Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 294, at 707 (Rhode
argues that a "lawyers' status ... [is] tied to client, colleague, and public perceptions
about the quality of justice they help generate. Accordingly, a primary function of ethical
codes is to reconcile the sometimes competing interests of these three constituencies.").
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namely jurors, from harm.313 And, society, in return, will continue to
allow lawyers the "benefits and privileges" of a legal monopoly; chief
among them, continued self-regulation. 314
Furthermore, both the nature of the legal profession and its purported
commitment to improving the quality of justice warrant an ethical rule.
The Model Rules contemplate lawyers as having a special duty to ensure
fairness in our system and "not [to] tolerate laws, behavior, or attitudes
that indicate that any member of society is being treated unfairly because
he or she belongs to a particular segment of society.13 1  As the protec-
tors of individual rights, lawyers, to a large extent, have an obligation "to
attempt to eliminate discrimination-which represents an unjust denial
of individual rights-from all of society. 3 1 6
Indeed, these principles have not been lost on some jurisdictions. 1
Recently, Minnesota, New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island
amended their ethical codes to adopt a rule designed to prohibit lawyers
from discriminating while practicing law.319 These rules contain the as-
pirational goals of promoting equality and confidence in the legal system.
Moreover, they attempt to use discipline to mandate social change.31 9
The logical next step should be for the American Bar Association to for-
mulate an ethical rule on the national level.
313. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (discussing harm inflicted upon
jurors excluded from service on jury).
314. Moore, supra note 311, at 13. As the Preamble to the Model Rules indicates,
"[t]o the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occa-
sion for governmental regulation is obviated." Model Rules Preamble. Indeed, one way
to "preempt" government regulation is to "persuad[e] the public that the profession has
itself adopted appropriate standards of conduct." Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers, supra
note 294, at 714.
315. Suzannah B. Wilson, Eliminating Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession: The
Key to Widespread Social Reform, 67 Ind. L. Rev. 817, 840 (1992).
316. Id. at 841-42.
317. Fourteen states have adopted various ethical rules banning lawyer discrimination
in one context or another. See Randall Samborn, Ethics Codes Seek to Bar Discrimina-
tion, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 29, 1993, at 1. Moreover, the ABA plans to debate such an anti-
discrimination ethical rule at their winter convention. See id. That rule would make it
professional misconduct to "knowingly manifest by words or conduct, in the course of
representing a client, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation, or socio-economic status." Id.
318. For Minnesota, see 52 M.S.A., Minn. Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(g)
(1992). For New Jersey, see N.J. Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) (1991). For New
York, see N.Y. Model Rules on Professional Conduct DR-102(A)(6) (1992). And, for
Rhode Island, see R.I. Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) (1992). While presumably
these rules could be interpreted to include banning discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges, this Note still advocates the incorporation of a more specific rule.
319. See generally Brenda Jones Quick, Ethical Rules Prohibiting Discrimination By
Lawyers: The Legal Profession's Response to Discrimination on the Rise, 7 Notre Dame
J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 5 (1993) (discussing advent of ethical rules banning discrimina-
tion); Andrew Pugh, Note, The Anti-Discrimination Amendments to Rule 8.4 of the Min-
nesota Rules of Professional Conduct. An Unnecessary and Unprecedented Expansion in
Professional Regulation, 19 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 211 (1993) (discussing Minnesota's
rule).
1993]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
3. A Possible Criticism
An immediate criticism of this proposed Rule is that disciplinary enti-
ties rarely enforce the Model Rules; thus, some argue that the ethical
rules fail in actually changing the behavior of attorneys.320 Ethical rules,
however, need not be enforced in order to prove effective. 32' As one au-
thor has written, "[t]he use of coercive sanctions is by no means the sole,
or even the most important means by which a profession uses a code to
regulate the conduct of its members. '32
2
Indeed, by forcing individual attorneys to confront the ethical conse-
quences of their actions, ethical rules can help to shape the moral con-
science of the legal profession.32 3 In this respect, ethical rules can
produce results through self-restraint and peer pressure.324 Moreover,
the instruction of legal ethics in law school provides an additional forum
for instilling professional norms and attitudes.325 Thus, law school stu-
dents "develop[] an awareness of the importance of ethical principles"
early in their careers.326 But more importantly, the Rule will teach a
future generation of laws the importance of eliminating racial discrimina-
tion in the courtroom.
CONCLUSION
In Batson v. Kentucky327 and its progeny,328 the Supreme Court at-
tempted to prevent the use of racially discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges. Lower court implementation of Batson, however, demonstrates
that attorneys still remain able to strike minority jurors from the venire
solely on account of their race. To accomplish this goal, attorneys have
resorted to pretextual reasoning and the courts seem unable to stop this
practice.329 As a solution, this Note proposes an ethical rule to combat
320. See Abel, supra note 304, at 647-49; Cahn, supra note 291, at 30. But see Rhode,
Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 294, at 708 ("there has been little empirical investiga-
tion regarding compliance with professional standards").
321. See Moore, supra note 311, at 14; Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 294,
at 709.
322. Moore, supra note 311, at 14.
323. See Cahn, supra note 291, at 27 (writing that "legal ethics help shape the con-
science of lawyers"); Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 294, at 709 (stating that
ethical standards "sensitiz[e] individuals to the full ethical dimensions of their conduct");
see also Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 293, at 643. Rhode argues that the es-
sence of ethical rules is to force lawyers to realize the consequences of their professional
actions and then accept personal responsibility for them. In effect, ethical rules remove a
"source of rationalization for dubious conduct." Id. at 648.
324. See Moore, supra note 310, at 14; Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers, supra note 294,
at 709.
325. See Moore, supra note 310, at 18 & n.65 (discussing instruction of ethics in law
school).
326. Moore, supra note 310, at 18.
327. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See supra notes 22-50 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 51-90 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 90-259 and accompanying text.
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the problem of discrimination in the context of jury selection.330 Indeed,
such a rule would evidence a commitment by the legal profession to
equality and fairness in the administration of justice as well as a willing-
ness to combat racism in the courtroom. 331
330. See supra notes 284-87 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 284-326 and accompanying text.

